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ERIE’S INTERNATIONAL EFFECT: A REPLY
Donald Earl Childress III*
INTRODUCTION
If recent trends continue, it is likely that U.S. federal district courts
sitting in diversity or alienage will confront transnational choice of law
issues1 in a significant number of cases in the years to come.2 Currently,
when resolving these issues, federal district courts unflinchingly follow
state choice of law rules to determine the governing substantive law (U.S.
state or foreign).3 Federal courts believe they are compelled by the Erie
doctrine to follow state choice of law rules even in transnational cases
because, according to the Supreme Court in a decision from the 1970s that
predates the substantial expansion of transnational litigation, a “federal
court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules
exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal
court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the
federal court sits.”4 Even when the foreign affairs or public policy interests
of the United States might be implicated in the case, and even when those
interests might be significantly different from the forum state’s interests,
federal courts apply state choice of law rules. Put simply, transnational
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1
As used here, transnational choice of law refers to a case where a federal court is asked to choose
between applying U.S. law (e.g., the law of Virginia) or foreign, non-U.S. law (e.g., the law of France).
See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 3–4 (2006) (defining international (state) conflicts as conflicts between the laws of the several
states and the laws of foreign countries). Transnational choice of law issues would tend to arise in cases
involving a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, acts or omissions occurring in a foreign country, or
some combination of these elements.
2
See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 31, 37 (2011)
(“Our third conjecture is that in 2021, U.S. judges and lawyers will encounter issues involving the law of
foreign countries more often than ever.”). There is also reason to believe that state courts will confront
similar issues. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next
Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012); Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl
Childress III, & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013).
3
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that under the Erie
doctrine, a federal court must apply state choice of law rules).
4
Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam).
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choice of law in diversity and alienage cases before federal district courts is
U.S. state law.
In When Erie Goes International5 (the Article), I endeavored to open
up a conversation concerning the Erie doctrine’s applicability in
transnational cases. While potential points for discussion were many, I
explored the concrete questions raised by the application of the Erie
doctrine to transnational choice of law. I began by evaluating whether the
Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act, which
may counsel in favor of the application of the choice of law rules of the
several states in domestic cases, similarly require the application of state
choice of law rules in transnational cases. They do not.6
Given that the Erie doctrine is animated by the “twin aims” of
discouraging forum shopping between state and federal courts and avoiding
the inequitable administration of the laws,7 I next evaluated whether those
aims were met by applying state choice of law rules in transnational cases.
At least in some cases, they were not.8 Among other things, I illustrated that
a doctrine designed to create parity between federal and state courts when
interpreting state law in domestic cases has morphed into a doctrine that
also elevates parity between federal and state courts in the same state when
applying state or foreign law in transnational cases.9 As the Article
explored, this should not necessarily be the case in light of the modern
experience with transnational litigation, where, in many cases, federal
interests and foreign affairs are implicated.
Even more troubling for our federal system, this parity requirement
creates the opportunity for forum shopping between the several states for
the most favorable state choice of law rule to govern a transnational case.
For instance, if a French plaintiff is injured in France by a U.S. corporation
subject to general jurisdiction in California and Virginia, the French
plaintiff will compare those states’ choice of law rules to determine where
the case should be filed. If the plaintiff desires French law, she might favor
filing in Virginia, given that Virginia’s choice of law rules select the law
where the injury occurred.10 If, however, California law is more favorable to
the plaintiff’s claim, she might favor filing in California, where choice of
law rules might select the law of California.11 Enter horizontal forum
shopping.
5

Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531 (2011).
See id. at 1555–66.
7
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965).
8
See Childress, supra note 5, at 1570–73.
9
See id.
10
See, e.g., Hodson v. A. H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809, 823 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding “that the
Virginia rule in personal injury actions is . . . the law of the place of the injury”).
11
See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721 (Cal. 1976) (illustrating California’s
comparative impairment approach).
6
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As this example shows, there is also the risk of inequitable
administration of the laws in transnational cases. These cases will be treated
differently by the varying choice of law rules of the several states
depending on where they are filed. More so, there is the risk that important
federal interests will not be given effect in transnational cases because state
choice of law rules are seen as the only rules that matter.
A brief example that is currently bedeviling courts shows the present
salience of the question: Should it be the case that the choice of law rules of
New York determine whether heirs of Holocaust victims, whose art was
allegedly stolen by the Nazis, may state a claim for relief in federal court,
when it is the United States that has undertaken international law
obligations to repatriate this property?12 In short, applying the Erie doctrine
in transnational cases without a critical lens perhaps leads to results adverse
to U.S. public policy.
In light of Erie’s twin aims, I put forward a suggested approach to
encourage courts to more forthrightly engage in analyzing transnational
conflicts cases.13 In brief, the approach was as follows. First, a federal court
should determine whether a conflict between U.S. and foreign law exists.14
If there is not a conflict, the court may apply forum law, assuming that law
has at least some constitutionally sufficient connection to the case. Second,
if there is a conflict, the federal court should evaluate critically whether the
application of a state’s choice of law rules support federal objectives.15 In
other words, it should not unflinchingly apply state choice of law rules in
transnational cases. Should those rules, however, support federal objectives,
it is well established that federal district courts may apply state law, not
because of compulsion under Erie and Klaxon but because it does not
thwart federal objectives.16 As such, a federal court may choose to follow
state conflict of laws rules directing it to apply foreign law or some other
law.
Third, if the court concludes that federal interests are not effectuated
by state choice of law rules, it must endeavor to locate a jurisdiction that
12

See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 12-1160, 2013 WL
1193864 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2013).
13
See Childress, supra note 5, at 1573–79.
14
In many circumstances, even this initial inquiry is short circuited on account of the increasing
willingness of courts to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 1572.
15
Cf. Ungaro–Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that
the Erie doctrine does not apply to litigation that implicates the nation’s foreign relations; federal
common law applies in those cases).
16
See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (“[F]ederal courts should
‘incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision,’ unless ‘application of [the particular] state law
[in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs.’”) (alterations in original)
(quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (“This federal reference to state law will not obtain,
of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.”).
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has the requisite constitutional contacts with the case such that the
application of that law would effectuate federal interests. A court would not
be left to totally write on a clean slate, as most federal courts recognize
generally that for purposes of federal conflicts law the Second Restatement
is controlling.17 Furthermore, courts could look to the development of the
law in the several states.18
In exploring Erie’s transnational effects in the choice of law context, I
had several hopes. First, I hoped to encourage a more sophisticated
understanding of the unique dynamics that transnational litigation presents
for domestic courts. I wanted to test whether importing whole-cloth
domestic doctrines like the Erie doctrine to adjudicate transnational cases
makes sense. In some cases, it might; in others, it might not. In either event,
we need to examine critically whether a doctrine’s application serves its
stated goals. It is questionable whether the Erie doctrine does that in
transnational choice of law cases.
Second, I hoped to explain that transnational and domestic cases might
be different and could be treated differently by courts. Third, I wanted to
test empirically the impact that the Erie doctrine might have on other
doctrines. Surprisingly, I discovered that it might have an impact on the
forum non conveniens doctrine.19 Fourth, I hoped that bringing the unique
issues presented by transnational litigation in the Erie context to light would
encourage further scholarly study, leading to better outcomes in
transnational choice of law cases.
In light of these goals, I was pleased to see that one of the leading
scholars of the Erie doctrine, Professor Michael Steven Green, paid me the
high honor of engaging the Article.20 In his response, Professor Green
makes three points. First, he seeks to clarify that most of the Erie doctrine
still applies in the international context.21 Second, he critiques my
arguments for abandoning the Erie doctrine in transnational choice of law

17
See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing
to apply the logic of Klaxon to the choice of law question because of the international complexion of the
case and instead looking to Ninth Circuit case law as well as the Second Restatement to craft a federal
common law rule); see also, e.g., Alvarez–Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 2003)
(illustrating that the court looked to the Second Restatement to determine choice of law rules), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
18
See, e.g., Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. 226 F.3d 445, 449 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (illustrating
the relevance of “restatements of law . . . and the majority rule among other states” in resolving
underdeveloped questions of law).
19
See Childress, supra note 5, at 1560–65.
20
See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 165
(2013), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/17/LRColl2012n17Green.pdf.
21
See id. at 165–70.
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cases.22 Third, he argues that, even if my arguments succeed, the impact my
approach will have on many transnational cases is limited.23
Professor Green has given me much to think about, and I thank him for
that. In this Reply, I will follow his thoughtful lead and make one point of
clarification before exploring more critical points. My clarificatory point
(Part I) is that the Article was indeed limited to transnational choice of law
and developing federal procedural common law rules for transnational
choice of law cases. However, even with that limitation, it has relevance to
other transnational areas impacted by the Erie doctrine. In short, while
Professor Green appears to focus on the fact that much of the Erie doctrine
remains applicable in many transnational cases, the fact that transnational
choice of law determinations will be on the rise in years to come counsels
in favor of a qualitative reevaluation of the Erie doctrine in those cases. As
I explain below, my critical point (Part II) is that the Erie doctrine, as
applied in transnational choice of law, may have effects on transnational
forum shopping. I conclude in Part III by illustrating briefly where
continuing the conversation on Erie’s international effects might take us.
I. ERIE AND TRANSNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW
Let me begin with where we agree. As Professor Green recognizes, the
point of the Article was not to suggest that federal district courts sitting in
diversity or alienage adjudicating transnational cases have the ability to
craft a federal common law rule to govern the substance of the dispute.24
Federal district courts are not free, absent congressional authorization, to
make substantive law to govern transnational cases when sitting in diversity
or alienage, just as they are not free to create such rules in domestic cases.
Rather, my argument was that in certain circumstances where a federal
interest is manifest, federal district courts might displace a state choice of
law rule with a federal choice of law rule that would support federal
interests. In other words, a federal district court may develop federal
procedural common law to vindicate federal interests. As such, the federal
court, through its own choice of law rule, might choose to apply different
substantive law—be it U.S. state or foreign—in a transnational case, than
would a state court in the forum where it sits.
In making this clarification, I appreciate that Professor Green
highlights one question that looms behind my observation that the twin
aims of Erie might encourage the development of a federal procedural
common law rule in transnational choice of law cases—namely, whether
this federal procedural common law is preemptive federal law that must be

22
23
24

See id. at 170–75.
See id. at 175–79.
See id. at 166–69.
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applied not only in federal court but also in state court.25 As I explained in
the Article, transnational choice of law rules could be developed as federal
common law that is either preemptive federal law or nonpreemptive federal
procedural common law. In my view, courts should adopt the latter
approach and develop federal procedural common law, which is not treated
as preemptive federal law.26 In taking this more limited approach, the
opportunity for further refinement, perhaps even by Congress, is left open.27
Let me briefly note one disagreement with this clarificatory point that
will be discussed in more detail below. In Professor Green’s view, “[e]ven
if the arguments in Childress’s article succeed, their effect is relatively
narrow.”28 To begin with, this is an empirical question. Professor Green’s
response provides no empirical evidence that the impact will indeed be
narrow. In fact, his response does not discuss any actual cases where the
impact of the doctrine might be applicable. In short, if his is a quantitative
point, I think we need to have a firmer grasp of the universe of cases before
we can proclaim such narrow applicability. Even assuming the impact is
narrow, however, I think there is something to be gained by questioning the
application of a domestic doctrine from the last century to the fast-moving
transnational world of litigation today. In short, narrowness might point the
way to significant problems created by the unflinching application of
domestic doctrines to transnational cases.
II. ERIE’S IMPACT ON TRANSNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW
In this Part, I examine more closely the impact that the Erie doctrine
has in transnational choice of law cases. First, I explore how the doctrine
encourages horizontal forum shopping. Second, I examine the doctrine’s
impact on forum non conveniens and the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Both of these sections illustrate why continued reevaluation of the Erie
doctrine’s applicability in transnational cases is timely and appropriate.
A. Horizontal Forum Shopping
Professor Green criticizes my argument that horizontal forum shopping
supports reevaluating Erie’s application to transnational choice of law. He
argues that my analysis is too comprehensive (because my arguments apply
beyond transnational cases) and yet also too narrow (because I do not go as
far as federalizing choice of law in state courts).29 As to comprehensiveness,
25

See id. at 170.
See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 818 (2008) (noting that
“procedural common law differs from substantive common law only in that it . . . does not bind state
courts”).
27
The disuniformity and inequity created by refusing to completely federalize choice of law in
transnational cases will be discussed, with other matters, in Part II.
28
Green, supra note 20, at 165.
29
Id. at 172.
26
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he notes that if Klaxon is undermined by transnational forum shopping, so
too is it undermined by domestic forum shopping. According to him, I
“offer[] no evidence that horizontal forum shopping is more of a problem
when the choice is between the laws of a state and a foreign nation than
when it is between the laws of two states.”30
But horizontal forum shopping is a greater concern in transnational
cases. In the early 1980s, Lord Denning, perhaps the most celebrated
English judge of the twentieth century,31 famously opined: “As a moth is
drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only
get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”32 There are several
reasons for this. First, U.S. substantive law is thought to be more favorable
to plaintiffs than the laws of other countries. Second, U.S. procedural law—
in particular, notice pleading, liberal discovery, and aggregate litigation—
gives plaintiffs substantial leverage in pleading, proving, trying, and settling
their cases. Third, U.S. damages law—especially punitive damages and jury
awards—presents the potential for a windfall for plaintiffs, or, at a
minimum, significant ability to force defendants to settle.33 While we are in
the midst of change to the substantive and procedural laws of foreign fora,
in part brought about by a restrictive U.S. approach to transnational
litigation, the general belief is that a foreign plaintiff would be expected to
choose a U.S. forum to bring suit, if possible as a matter of jurisdiction, in
order to take advantage of more favorable U.S. law. This is so even in cases
where the harms complained of occurred abroad and in cases where the
evidence is located abroad.
Of course, these reasons illustrate why a plaintiff would choose to
bring suit in the United States generally. A plaintiff would want to bring a
transnational case in the United States specifically because they can forum
shop amongst the several states for the most favorable substantive law. The
Erie doctrine makes this forum shopping possible in federal court as well
by requiring federal courts to apply the choice of law rules of the state in
which they sit, even when application of those rules might not effectuate
federal interests or public policy. As Professor Green’s hypothetical
illustrates, a California plaintiff injured in Germany by a product made by a
California company subject to general jurisdiction in California and
Virginia, who would prefer to have German law apply, would consider

30

Id. at 171.
J. Skelly Wright, Law and the Logic of Experience: Reflections on Denning, Devlin, and Judicial
Innovation in the British Context, 33 STAN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1980).
32
Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (A.C.) at 733 (Eng.).
33
See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09, 516
(2008).
31
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forum shopping to Virginia, as it follows the First Restatement and would
be expected to apply the law of the state of injury.34
Compare this to purely domestic cases. While there are procedural
differences between the several states, they are not as great as those
encountered between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions. For instance, most
states provide for class actions, while aggregate litigation is limited abroad.
Similarly, most states provide for liberal discovery, which is also limited
abroad. Likewise, there is a greater likelihood of similarity between the
substantive laws of various U.S. jurisdictions, as opposed to the laws
between a common law jurisdiction like the United States and the rest of the
world, which is predominantly based on civil law. The greater similarity in
procedural and substantive law between the several states prevents many of
these forum shopping incentives from having the same impact in domestic
cases.
Above and beyond all of these concerns, perhaps the most compelling
reason that transnational forum shopping is a concern is that it risks
entangling courts with foreign sovereigns and enmeshing courts in foreign
affairs. Foreign sovereigns have objected frequently to U.S. courts hearing
transnational cases. Many transnational cases also present issues perhaps
more appropriately within the competence of the Executive or Congress.
These issues do not exist with the same force in domestic forum shopping
cases.
Confirming the importance of the transnational forum shopping
problem, a scholarly literature is developing that illustrates a transnational
forum shopping market to enforce foreign judgments in the United States.35
This transnational market is developing precisely because state recognition
and enforcement rules differ,36 and because federal district courts sitting in
diversity or alienage believe that the Erie doctrine requires the application
of state recognition and enforcement rules.37 As a result, judgment creditors
take advantage of disparate enforcement regimes in the several states to
forum shop for a state where enforcement will be most easily granted. Once
granted, the foreign judgment is treated as a domestic judgment and must be
granted full faith and credit in another U.S. state. With the likelihood of

34

See Green, supra note 20, at 171. I have had to change Professor Green’s hypothetical slightly to
account for personal jurisdiction. In his original hypothetical, a California company manufactured a
product in California that injured a Californian in Germany. Under such facts, the only fora where the
plaintiff could file suit would be California or Germany.
35
See generally Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and the
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2013)
(examining the way litigants forum shop for favorable enforcement law).
36
See id.
37
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. c (1971) (noting that there is
“consensus” in state and federal courts that such matters are governed by state law).
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such enforcement actions increasing before U.S. courts,38 so too is the
potential for increased forum shopping in transnational cases.
In short, the risk of horizontal forum shopping is greater in
transnational cases. As these cases continue to make their way into U.S.
courts, the ill effects of the present approach to transnational choice of law
will become more manifest. In light of the fact that transnational cases risk
bringing the United States in conflict with foreign sovereigns, there is every
reason to support reexamining the Erie doctrine’s application in
transnational choice of law cases.
As to Professor Green’s narrowness point, he is correct that I do not
believe transnational choice of law should “be federalized in state court.”39
Of course, this belief creates tension because the potential unity encouraged
by federalizing some choice of law in transnational cases filed in federal
courts might be short circuited by forum shopping between state courts. In
other words, what good is it if plaintiffs can escape federal procedural
choice of law by filing in state courts to avail themselves of favorable
choice of law rules?
Two responses: First, many transnational cases will be subject to
removal and thus limit the possibility of state-to-state forum shopping that
is risked by not federalizing state choice of law. To be sure, there is some
risk that reverse forum shopping by defendants might be equally
problematic. However, by providing a federal forum that takes account of
federal interests, there is the possibility that the playing field might be
leveled. Second, the fact that federal courts would be permitted, in my
approach, to develop federal choice of law will place state choice of law in
sharp relief. To the extent a federal district court creates a federal choice of
law rule in an instant case, such a rule will signal to other courts and
policymakers that legal reform might be necessary. For instance, Congress
might step in to resolve some of the issues created by disuniform federal
and state rules, as was done in the case of the Class Action Fairness Act. 40
As such, and to the extent there is disuniformity, Congress might be moved
to take legislative action to account for this type of horizontal forum
shopping.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
Continuing his theme that my approach is both too comprehensive and
too narrow, and after agreeing with the Article (although not its proposals)
that requiring the application of state choice of law rules in transnational

38

See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 2, at 39 (stating that U.S courts are encountering foreign
law issues with greater frequency).
39
Green, supra note 20, at 172.
40
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006); see Childress, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism,
and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, supra note 2, at 755–57.

9

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY

cases is about the twin aims of Erie and not the Rules of Decision Act,41
Professor Green turns to my argument that federal courts are increasingly
using forum non conveniens to short circuit choice of law analysis in
transnational cases. In examining how forum non conveniens and the Erie
doctrine overlap, my point was to show that legal doctrine has litigation
effects that should be explored empirically. Professor Green argues that at
best this observation would support “a federal common law rule that limits
a court’s ability to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds simply
because foreign law applies,”42 and does not support the creation of federal
choice of law rules in transnational cases. Before getting to the substance of
his critique, let us look at some updated numbers that paint a more complete
picture from the numbers developed in the original Article.
As I noted in the Article, there has been a significant increase in forum
non conveniens decisions in federal courts in recent years. Between 1990
and 2006, there were roughly 691 (about 43 per year) reported transnational
forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.43 Overall, the courts
dismissed in favor of a foreign forum in about 50% of these cases.44 In cases
involving a foreign plaintiff, the dismissal rate was higher, at 63.4%.45
Moreover, foreign plaintiffs are “twice as likely to have their suits
dismissed” compared to domestic plaintiffs.46
In light of these numbers, the Article took a snapshot of cases filed preand post-Sinochem,47 up to April 1, 2011. Sinochem is not only the Court’s
most recent forum non conveniens decision, but also might encourage
41
I am unclear as to Professor Green’s ultimate conclusion on the Rules Enabling Act’s
applicability. At one point, he seems to say that it applies, and then, in a footnote, he reserves judgment.
See Green, supra note 20, at 169 & n.38. He argues that I give “no reason to think that the Rules
Enabling Act’s substantive right limitation does not apply in an international context.” Id. at 169. But, he
gives us no reason to think that it does. See id. at n.38. One would think greater specificity should be
required when applying congressional legislation to foreign issues. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (reaffirming the presumption against the extraterritorial application
of acts of Congress).
42
Green, supra note 20, at 174.
43
Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The
Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033.
44
Id. at 16.
45
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 503
(2011). This is likely accounted for by the fact that in conducting the forum non conveniens analysis a
court may give less deference to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum under Supreme Court case law. See
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (“When the home forum [is] chosen, it is
reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this
assumption is . . . less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to
ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”). Indeed, I note
that such a demonstrated disparity between domestic and foreign plaintiffs may itself have implications
for U.S. foreign relations.
46
Whytock, supra note 45, at 503–04.
47
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
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greater use of the doctrine, as the Court there held that a forum non
conveniens dismissal could be entered even before determining the question
of jurisdiction.48 A search of cases invoking the doctrine after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sinochem up to January 1, 2012, confirms that motions
to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens may be on the rise.49
Since Sinochem, 94 reported cases have raised the issue (about 24 per
year). Of those, 48% were dismissed.50 Of these dismissals, 82% explicitly
recognized that a reason for dismissal was the application of foreign law.51
When foreign plaintiffs are involved, the numbers tell a slightly different
story. Since Sinochem, 56 of the 94 cases (nearly 60%) involved foreign
plaintiffs. Of these cases, the dismissal rate was 52%.
Yet these numbers likely underreport the real impact of the doctrine on
cases before the federal courts. Since 2007, courts have increasingly dealt
with these issues through unpublished opinions—while 45% of these cases
were reported in 2007, only 17% were reported in 2011.52 Indeed, during
the timeframe of Whytock’s study, the reporting rate was closer to 45%.53
While the dismissal rate for unpublished decisions hovers around 51%,
what is striking is that there had been 261 unpublished cases raising forum
non conveniens since Sinochem. Of these unreported cases, 75% explicitly
recognized the application of foreign law as a reason for dismissal.54 When
foreign plaintiffs were involved (in 102 of the 261 cases), the dismissal rate
jumped to 71%. In sum, approximately 355 cases since Sinochem have
raised forum non conveniens, with an average of 78.5% recognizing foreign
law as an important factor in dismissing the case.55 One hundred fifty-eight
of these cases involved foreign plaintiffs, and on average, 62% were
dismissed.56
The data for all of 2012 presents a slightly different picture. In 2012,
twelve reported cases raised the issue of forum non conveniens. Of those,
48

Id. at 435.
In short, the approach was as follows: First, the Westlaw database was searched for all U.S.
district court cases raising the term forum non conveniens between March 5, 2007, (the date of the
Sinochem decision) and January 1, 2012. Second, all decisions were then reviewed and cases that were
not actual decisions by U.S. federal district courts granting or denying a forum non conveniens motion
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42% were dismissed. Of these dismissals, 60% explicitly recognized that a
reason for dismissal was the application of foreign law. When foreign
plaintiffs were involved, the numbers changed. In 2012, seven of twelve
reported cases (58%) involved foreign plaintiffs. Of these cases, the
dismissal rate was 57%.
In 2012, only 20% of cases raising forum non conveniens questions
were reported, with 80% being unreported. Of the unreported cases, 45%
were dismissed. Sixty-seven percent of unreported cases explicitly
recognized the application of foreign law as a reason for dismissal. When
foreign plaintiffs were involved (36% of cases), the dismissal rate was 71%.
Courts may thus be using the forum non conveniens doctrine to resist
applying foreign law and may be pushing such decisions to unreported
cases.
As explained in the Article, the fact that the Erie doctrine might be
creating this system in part is yet another reason to reexamine our
commitments to its application in transnational cases. As Professor Green
notes, federalizing choice of law in transnational cases is but one way to
deal with this issue. But, there may be other ways to deal with this issue.
These ways will only be considered once we cast aside our uncritical
commitment to Erie’s absolute application in transnational choice of law. In
sum, I may be right that limited federalization of choice of law in
transnational cases helps deal with this issue; Professor Green may be right
that federalizing and changing the forum non conveniens doctrine may be
the more appropriate approach.
As I illustrated in the Article, we cannot get to the proposal stage
without being willing to question the Erie doctrine’s application in actual
transnational cases. The fact that Professor Green has offered a
counterproposal to a proposal put forward in light of a critical evaluation of
the Erie doctrine’s application in transnational cases illustrates why the
unflinching application of the Erie doctrine in transnational cases is worth
questioning, for it might lead to law reform.
III. WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING?
Professor Green’s final point is that my approach will be applied only
rarely. Indeed, I argue that federal choice of law rules should be developed
only in cases where federal interests are frustrated and a federal rule would
do more than a state rule to further those interests. According to Professor
Green, my position would work in Sabbatino-like cases, but other situations
would be “unusual.”57
Yet, we cannot know what the future will bring. As already alluded to,
however, transnational litigation, transnational choice of law, and
57
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transnational enforcement of judgments are growing industries. Some
transnational cases will be filed that raise issues primarily of importance
only to the parties—e.g., a suit between a foreign plaintiff and a U.S.
defendant for alleged tortious interference with a private contract in a
foreign country. Other cases will, however, raise important public
regulatory concerns—e.g., a suit between a foreign plaintiff and a U.S.
defendant for alleged torts committed in violation of environmental laws,
where such actions were taken in concert with foreign governments or
officials. And, of course, the question of enforcement of foreign judgments
may raise many public and federal interests as well.
Here is just one example. On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the Alien Tort
Statute.58 As I have suggested elsewhere, there is every reason to believe
that foreign plaintiffs will now seek to bring these suits under state and
foreign law in federal court.59 Federal district courts sitting in diversity and
alienage will now face significant choice of law questions. “If courts in
fifty-two jurisdictions are asked to apply state choice of law rules, the
possible solutions to the choice-of-law conundrum are almost
immeasurable. With so many inputs, probability analysis reveals literally
hundreds of available outcomes.”60 In a post-Kiobel world where plaintiffs
forum shop in pursuit of the most favorable outcome, the divergent choice
of law approaches must be part of the analysis. And the appropriateness of a
federal choice of law rule might be necessary and fitting.
In such cases, which could amount to scores in any given year if past
numbers are accurate, U.S. federal courts would be asked to call into
question actions taken by a foreign sovereign within that sovereign’s
territory. Cases like Sabbatino are not as unusual as they may seem in light
of the rapidly evolving world of transnational litigation.
Finally, Professor Green explains that my “reconceptualization of
international choice of law would be . . . disruptive.”61 Experimentation in
situations where the status quo presents the potential for inadequacy is
always disruptive. Disruption has its own benefit: it signals to policymakers
that legal doctrine is perhaps not working and should be subject to
investigation not just by courts but by democratically elected branches of
government.
In sum, laying bare the policy arguments and implications of the Erie
doctrine’s application in transnational choice of law cases affords us the
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opportunity to pull back the curtain on an area of law that is in need of
clarity and development.
CONCLUSION
Let me return again to a point made earlier. The purpose of When Erie
Goes International was to open up a conversation concerning the
applications and implications of the Erie doctrine in transnational cases. In
short, the question was: Should federal courts continue to unflinchingly
apply the Erie doctrine in transnational choice of law cases? There are
many other related questions that could be asked. For instance, when
choosing foreign law, it is debatable what level of interpretive fidelity must
be given to the foreign jurisdiction’s determinations as to its law. Indeed, it
is contestable whether that is the right question to ask at all or whether the
question is what interpretive fidelity would the state court give to the
foreign jurisdiction’s determinations.62 According to one recent article,
“when federal courts apply a state’s choice of law rules, they are not bound
to follow state courts’ understanding of foreign law that applies under such
rules.”63 While they are not bound, they may choose to do it nonetheless.64
In my view, the Erie doctrine muddles the analysis because it forecloses
forthright engagement with the real question at stake in many transnational
cases: Which state’s law should be applied?
Even beyond these questions, other questions that relate to
transnational choice of law and the Erie doctrine remain. Is the forum non
conveniens doctrine substantive or procedural for Erie purposes? Should
the question of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments be
governed by federal or state law?
In conclusion, the Article and this wonderful conversation with
Professor Green emphasize that there are many reasons to support
reexamining the application of the Erie doctrine in transnational cases. My
proposal—a first attempt, if you will, at working through these complex
issues—is not the only way to deal with the issues. If Erie is to “go
international,” we should carefully examine the reasons for so doing in light
of present realities in transnational litigation and examine other proposals.
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